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The varying roles of governance mechanisms on ex-post transaction costs and 
relationship commitment in buyer-supplier relationships 
Abstract
Inter-firm relationship governance is becoming increasingly fragmented and complex in industrial 
marketing and management. There is a need to develop an integrative framework, which describes 
the nature of the relationship (complementary or substitutes) between economic and sociological 
governance mechanisms, and their relative effectiveness in explaining ex-post transaction costs 
and relationship commitment. Building on transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange 
theory (SET), we investigate the varying roles of economic (i.e., contract completeness and 
symmetric dependence) and sociological (i.e., trust and communication) governance mechanisms. 
The deductive-nomological framework is tested by employing a nonparametric technique (i.e., 
partial least squares - PLS) to structural equation modeling (SEM) and semi-partial correlation. 
The analysis of data from 170 buyer-supplier relationships established by Finnish SMEs indicates 
that sociological mechanisms function as substitutes with contractual governance and 
complementary with symmetric dependence in relation to ex-post transaction costs and 
relationship commitment. Further, economic governance mechanisms have a more effective role 
in minimizing ex-post transaction costs, whereas sociological governance mechanisms are more 
powerful in enhancing relationship commitment.
Keywords: Relationship governance mechanisms; ex-post transaction costs; relationship 
commitment; buyer-supplier relationships; structural equation modeling  
1. Introduction
Minimizing transaction costs and maximizing relationship commitment have become the central 
research phenomena in inter-firm relationship management. Transaction cost is defined by 
Williamson (1985) as all of the ex-ante and ex-post contracting, monitoring and enforcement costs 
connected with conducting exchange activities between firms (Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). 
Relationship commitment, on the other hand, is considered as a central ingredient of the 
relationship marketing model affecting the behavior of partners (Shi et al., 2011), and involves a 
need to develop and maintain a stable relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). However, the 
uncertainty of buyers and suppliers regarding the expectations whether the counterpart abandons 
opportunistic behavior and acts cooperatively in bargaining and negotiation is an inevitable 
dilemma in relationship exchange (Gorton et al., 2015). Similarly, incomplete contracts, distrust, 
asymmetric information sharing and interdependence, differences in objectives as well as 
unanticipated changes in the market are depicted as negative forces influencing transaction costs 
and relationship commitment.  
Governance, therefore, becomes pivotal in buyer-supplier relationship development (Liu et al., 
2017a; Luo et al., 2015). Prior inter-firm governance literature suggests that, in order to achieve 
joint objectives, firms need to erect appropriate governance factors, namely; economic and 
sociological mechanisms (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2009), rooted in 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET). Economic mechanisms, in 
line with TCE, include certain governance factors, firms emplaced to avoid transactional 
uncertainties through adequate structural implications. Whereas sociological mechanisms as SET 
factors help to govern inter-firm relationships by developing a cooperative environment between 
firms (Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017a).  
Although prior empirical research has extensively documented the effective roles of governance 
mechanisms, it remains in limited context of opportunism mitigation (e.g., Liu et al., 2009; Luo et 
al., 2015), relationship performance (e.g., Yang et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017a) and conflict 
management (e.g., Yang et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). A growing 
number of empirical studies demonstrate that economic structure of relationship exchange is 
sociologically embedded (e.g., Granovetter, 2005; Dyer & Chu, 2011). Some past empirical 
studies have investigated only a few governance mechanisms i.e. trust and transaction-specific 
investments, their roles remained in isolation in explaining governance cost (Dyer & Chu, 2003; 
Corsten & Felde 2005; Bharadwaj & Matsuno 2006) and commitment (Shi et al., 2011; Chang et 
al., 2012). Moreover, several recent studies on inter-firm have called for a systematic research on 
distinct roles of relationship governance mechanisms in relation to transaction costs and 
relationship commitment in different types of buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Burkert et al., 
2012; Gulbrandsen et al. 2017; Liu et al., 2017a). Therefore, researchers have different opinions 
as well as they found conflicting empirical results on whether these mechanisms function as 
complementary (Van der Valk et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009) or substitutive forces (Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005; Li et al., 2010). On the other hand, the relative effectiveness of these mechanisms 
is characterized by nuanced understanding of different transaction objectives driving governance 
structures, which is missing in the literature. 
Different governance structures are required for different transaction objectives in governing 
relationship exchange (Burkert et al., 2012). Better understanding of relationship outcomes and 
collaboration goals drive managers to analyze which governance mechanism is more crucial for a 
particular task (Yang et al., 2016). Therefore, the varying roles of economic and sociological 
governance mechanisms in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and maximizing relationship 
commitment has yet to be addressed. Such mixed evidence and conflicting views on 
complementary-substitutive perspective and relative effectiveness of governance mechanisms, 
therefore, necessitates further investigation of the phenomenon. Thus, an interesting question now 
is concerned with whether sociological governance mechanisms function as complementary or 
substitutes with contractual governance and symmetric dependence respectively in minimizing ex-
post transaction costs and fostering relationship commitment.     
To fill these gaps and provide further insights, this study aims to address the concerns mentioned 
above. Therefore, this study contributes to the industrial marketing and management literature by 
portraying a comprehensive picture of relative effectiveness, as well as the joint use of both 
economic (i.e., contract completeness and symmetric dependence) and sociological (i.e., trust and 
communication) governance mechanisms influencing ex-post transaction costs and relationship 
commitment. Further, it develops and empirically tests a nomological framework by employing a 
nonparametric technique (i.e., PLS) to SEM and semi-partial correlation. The empirically 
comparative investigation in concurrent examination of these two effects alongside will support 
us in understanding the relative influence of varying governance mechanisms in order to manage 
successful buyer-supplier relationships. Such techniques provide firms the opportunities to 
evaluate the relative effectiveness of various governance mechanisms (Yang et al., 2016). The 
study’s findings generally support our argument that economic mechanisms are relatively more 
effective at minimizing ex-post transaction costs, while sociological governance mechanisms are 
more effective at maximizing relationship commitment. Further, when sociological mechanisms 
interact with contract completeness and symmetric dependence, interesting findings emerge 
related to their complementary and substitutive nature.    
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships 
Governing successful buyer-supplier relationships in a systematic way is found to be pivotal in 
enhancing beneficial outcomes and stability (Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017a, 2017b). The main 
question, therefore, is how to design an effective governance structure where both parties are fully 
devoted to fulfilling their common business objectives (Luo et al., 2015). For this reason, several 
recent studies have highlighted the significance of multiple governance mechanisms (e.g., Bai et 
al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2017). These mechanisms are mainly found embedded in 
both economic and sociological mechanisms (Liu et al., 2017a, 2017b). 
2.1.1 Economic governance mechanisms
Economic governance mechanisms are explained in terms of economic rational organizational 
measures, which support managing, monitoring and harmonizing partners’ behaviors in 
relationship exchange (Williamson, 1985; Liu et al., 2009). Contract completeness and symmetric 
dependence, as economic mechanisms, demonstrate mutually specified contractual clauses and 
relationship specific investments (Brown et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2017b). Contractual governance 
is albeit ubiquitous and offers an institutional framework, regulating course of relationship 
exchange (Luo, 2009; Liu et al., 2017b), it varies in the level of completeness, complexities 
(Crocker & Reynolds, 1993), rigidity, and flexibility (Sande & Haugland, 2015). Several 
researchers have maintained that contracts will always be incomplete due to inevitable 
unpredictability (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Luo, 2009). Therefore, a relatively complete contract 
minimizes the boundary spanners’ uncertainty and risks of opportunisms. A well-defined contract 
is considered as a comprehensive instrument (i.e., explaining rules and regulations, rights and 
obligations of both parties) for safeguarding specific assets against opportunism (Luo, 2009; Liu 
et al., 2017b). Moreover, the level of completeness in a contract stipulates the extent to which 
contractual terms and future contingencies are specific and detailed. Term specificity highlights 
each partner’ rights, duties and responsibilities in order to organize and manage the relationship 
whereas contingency adaptability concerns the contractual response to future problems, conflicts 
and contingencies (Luo, 2002; Reuer & Arino, 2007). Hence, this level of contact completeness 
delineate exchange substance and structure resulting in maximum pay-off. 
Whereas symmetric dependence entails both relationship partners to invest idiosyncratically in 
physical and human assets that are less valuable to alternative uses (Kumar et al., 1995; Ali & 
Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017). These co-specialized investments create interdependence 
between partners, prior research, therefore argued that symmetric interdependence is a product of 
both partners’ equal dependence on each other by investing jointly in a relationship (e.g., Kumar 
et al., 1995; Wu & Wu, 2015). On the other hand, asymmetric dependence effects on coercive 
power of less dependent partner to exploit, and creates prospects for opportunism and conflict (Liu 
et al., 2017b; Shen et al., 2017). Therefore, high level of symmetric dependence enhances the joint 
motivation of forbearance and relational embeddedness between partners, and discourages 
individual private goal seeking by binding and locking firms to a particular course of action 
(Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999; Schmitz et al., 2016).  
2.1.2 Sociological governance mechanisms
Sociological governance mechanisms are defined as socially embedded organizational measures 
in economic activities, which help in managing, monitoring and organizing relationship exchange 
(Granovetter, 2005; Liu et al., 2017b). Based on existing research, we categorize two sociological 
governance mechanisms (i.e., trust and communication), which underlie the impact of relational 
ties between buyer and supplier. Trust is a non-contractual mechanism and defined as the 
willingness to trust or confidence that a partner holds about the other partner’s reliability, 
benevolence, and integrity (Zaheer et al., 1998). Prior research on relationship trust has 
distinguished different conceptualization and presented influential perspectives. Such as, Dyer and 
Chu (2011) highlighted trust as the level of confidence of a relationship partner for other partner’s 
fair behavior of not exploiting its vulnerabilities. On the other hand, Williamson (1993a) presented 
important economic perspective of trust and distinguished between calculative, personal and 
institutional trust. Calculative trust includes “relational” frame of trust nurtured by mutual hostages 
and considered as “risk”. Personal trust implicates in personal relationships and portrays as non-
calculative. Institutional trust refers to social and organizational embeddedness and appears also 
as being calculative. Both the relational calculation and the “leap of faith” comprise trust in 
business relationships. While effective communication, is considered as a useful tool in developing 
collaboration, integration and cooperation between relationship partners (Kim & Chai, 2017). It 
refers to the bilateral expectation of formal and/or informal sharing of meaningful and timely 
information exchange between relationship partners (Wang et al., 2016). Building on SET, we 
conceptualize that communication strengthens the confidence of both parties in a relationship in 
terms of the availability of particular information (Yang et al., 2017) that is timely, and offered 
frequently, formally and informally (Hung & Lin, 2013). 
In this study, both economic and sociological mechanisms are anticipated to mitigate ex-post 
transaction costs and to enhance relationship commitment. Transaction costs include the costs 
involved in order to attain jointly acceptable agreement (Zaheer et al., 1998; Luo et al., 2015). 
Notably, ex-post transaction costs contain the negotiation time and efforts required to define 
effective arrangements and to determine divisions of costs and benefits (Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). 
On the other hand, relationship commitment is defined as relationship partners’ confidence 
regarding the importance and efforts of maintaining the long-term relationship by willingly making 
short-term sacrifices. We conceptualize relationship commitment as a sense of loyalty and the 
continuity of business for a longer time to strengthen the relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; 
Tellefsen, 2002).    
2.2 Economic governance mechanisms, transaction costs, and relationship commitment  
The level of contractual completeness makes the relationship contractually explicit by mitigating 
partners’ anxiety and exchange hazards (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005), and functions as a safeguard 
against higher transaction costs. Previous research has argued that detailed contractual terms and 
clauses, as comprehensive instruments, effectively regulate behavioral boundaries, operational 
risks and opportunism, thus, developing relationship commitment and cost performance (Liu et 
al., 2009; Yang et al., 2017). Dyer and Chu (2003) argue that contracts minimize ex-post 
monitoring and enforcement costs because all the expectations and obligations are explicitly 
indicated during the contracting phase. On the other hand, some authors (e.g., Crocker & Reynolds, 
1993) suggest that contractual completeness is the optimal balance between ex-ante (e.g., writing 
the contract) and ex-post transaction costs (e.g., managing disputes). The former increases when 
environmental uncertainty increases, the latter increases when the risk of opportunism increases. 
Therefore, relatively more complete contract provides a framework for guarding against ex-post 
transaction costs and performance problems by controlling the private objectives of partners at the 
cost of mutual benefits (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Liu et al., 2017b). The more the extent to 
which a contract is complete, the less the ex-post transaction cost will be. However, previous 
empirical studies (Ruer & Arino, 2002; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005; Woolthuis et al., 2005; Liu et 
al., 2009) have suggested that complete contracts, by clearly specifying the promises and 
obligations of each partner, enhance long-term commitment by mitigating opportunism. Based on 
the focus of our study, we thus argue that relationship partners may mitigate ex-post transaction 
costs and enhance relationship commitment by using more complete and detailed contractual 
design.
Symmetric dependence corroborates the idiosyncratic relationship-specific investments by both 
partners (Khalid & Ali, 2017; Shen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017b) and enhance relationship 
commitment by creating interdependence between them. A high level of symmetrical 
interdependence is characterized by mutual investments indicating loyalty and cooperative long-
term relationship (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Furthermore, it prohibits the market mechanism 
deployment and private control in the relationship and becomes critical for improving cost 
performance and learning (Chang & Gotcher, 2007; Liu et al., 2017a). Previous seminal research 
has presented both positive and negative aspects of mutual investments in relation with transaction 
costs. For example, several researchers (e.g., Williamson, 1985; Dyer, 1997) argued that increase 
in asset specificity escalates opportunism, transaction costs and hold-up problems during the early 
stages of relationship. However, once the relationship is developed and adequate level of trust and 
symmetrical interdependence is attained, relationship partners become more loyal to each other 
(Liu et al., 2009) and expect continuous future transactions, thereby resulting in lower transaction 
costs. On the other hand, asymmetric interdependence can be counterproductive because less 
dependent partner dominates the relationship and exploits its weaker counterpart (Shen et al., 2017; 
Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007) thereby resulting in lower commitment and higher transaction costs 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). A fear of high switching costs enhances the relationship partners’ 
interest in maintaining a quality relationship and commitment (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Following 
transaction cost reasoning, researchers argued that higher level of symmetric dependence displays 
strong and cooperative bond and provides incentives for not abandoning the exchange and for 
developing the relationship as successfully as possible (e.g., Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007). Based 
on this theoretical examination, we argue that increase in the level of symmetric dependence 
creates mutual hostage and stabilizes the relationship by realigning the self-interest (Liu et al., 
2017b), that influence ex-post transaction costs and serves as a structural rationale for long-term 
committed relationship. Hence, we hypothesize that
H1: There is a negative relationship between the use of economic governance mechanisms of (a) 
contract completeness and (b) symmetric dependence, and ex-post transaction costs.  
H2: There is a positive relationship between the use of economic governance mechanisms of (a) 
contract completeness and (b) symmetric dependence, and relationship commitment.
2.3 Sociological governance mechanisms, transaction costs, and relationship commitment
As sociological governance mechanism, trust is a significant factor for developing transaction cost 
performance, with the importance of a cooperative atmosphere having been emphasized in some 
empirical studies (e.g., Khalid & Ali, 2017; Liu et al., 2017b). The willingness to trust or 
confidence in a partner, with regard to the other partner’s reliability, benevolence, and integrity, 
significantly influence ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. The propensity of 
trust between relationship partners may determine their reliance on trust to minimize transaction 
costs (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). Ex-post transaction costs are 
minimized more effectively if a high level of inter-organizational trust is emplaced, as negotiations 
can be quickly and easily successful because of relationship partners’ readiness (Zaheer et al., 
1998). While low level of mutual trust enhances the complexities in a relationship, thereby 
resulting in higher transaction costs and lower commitment. Further, trusted partners spend less 
time in haggling over problems, adapting to unforeseen circumstances and spending fewer 
resources monitoring each other’s behavior (Dyer & Chu, 2011; Burkert et al., 2012). Williamson 
(1993a) argued that if the degree to which associated investments between relationship partners 
are not cost effective, calculative form of trust becomes the solution in order to economize 
transaction costs. Trust being multidimensional concept functions as a substitute for hierarchal 
control and minimizes both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs by attenuating the efforts required 
to preempt the trustworthiness of counterpart. On the other hand, trust should positively impacts 
on relationship commitment. Trust is the main determinant of relationship commitment and firms 
seek only trustworthy relationship partners, therefore, the more the relationship partners trust each 
other, the more they feel committed and secured (Burkert et al., 2012). This narrative develops a 
perception of good faith, care and commitment for their counterpart rather than opportunistic 
behavior (Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
Communication as bilateral expectation of formal and informal information exchanges (Wang et 
al., 2016), can influence ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment (Hung & Lin, 
2013). These bilateral expectations refer to the partners’ beliefs regarding excellent 
communication, function as useful safeguards to deter conflicts, perceived risks and uncertainty 
(Heide & John, 1992; Yen et al., 2011). Conversely, ineffective communication or asymmetric 
information sharing create misunderstanding and place the partner in jeopardy (Villena et al., 
2011), which minimizes the likelihood of developing relationship quality and satisfaction (Hung 
& Lin, 2013), and maximizes the time and effort required to negotiate (i.e. ex-post transaction 
costs). As communication promotes harmonization between relationship partners in terms of the 
timely available information, it also helps in fostering confidence in partner’s reliability and 
integrity and thereby minimizes ex-post transaction costs (Hung & Lin, 2013; Wang et al., 2016). 
Therefore, prior empirical research has found a negative impact of communication on relationship 
partners’ bargaining costs (e.g., Yigitbasioglu, 2010). Furthermore, based on the loyalty and good 
faith between relationship partners, effective communication is crucial in knowledge sharing and 
cohesion, leading to conflict resolution and relationship commitment development (Yen et al., 
2011; Hung & Lin, 2013). Similarly, studies delineate that communication alleviates the 
uncertainty level and build a mutually bounded relationship thereby enhancing relationship 
commitment (e.g., Cai et al., 2009). Based on the above discussion, we derive the following 
hypotheses: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the use of sociological governance mechanisms of 
(a) trust and (b) communication, and ex-post transaction costs.  
H4: There is a positive relationship between the use of sociological governance mechanisms of (a) 
trust and (b) communication, and relationship commitment.
2.4 Interaction effects of economic and sociological governance mechanisms 
Prior research has presented two competing views toward the nature of the relationship, i.e. 
complementarity and substitution between relationship governance mechanisms. The 
complementarity view suggests that transactional and relational mechanisms function as 
complements (Luo, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Liu et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2017). However, the 
other view holds that, due to the varying nature of both transactional and relational mechanisms, 
joint adoption is less effective at governing inter-firm relationships (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005; Li 
et al., 2010). In this study, we examine how sociological governance mechanisms interact with 
contract completeness and symmetric dependence in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and 
maximizing relationship commitment. 
2.4.1 Interaction of sociological governance mechanisms and contract completeness 
Seminal studies have viewed sociological governance mechanisms and contracts as substitutes 
believing that the presence of one prevents the use of other (Li et al., 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004; 
Wang et al., 2011). The theoretical reasons behind this substitution explain the importance of 
sociological governance against contractual safeguards. Indeed, a contract may minimize the risk 
of opportunism, it may also be seen as counterproductive to trust and bilateral communication 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). Further, researchers argued that sociological mechanisms mitigate 
relational risks by enhancing confidence in a partner’s willingness (Lui & Ngo, 2004), thereby 
minimizing the redundant specification of monitoring contractual clauses (Gulati & Sytch, 2008; 
Li et al., 2010). This notion results in closer cooperation and fostered commitment between 
partners. On the other side, detailed contracts may be interpreted as a sign of unfairness and hinder 
the formation of sociological governance by enforcing contractual clauses (Lumineau & 
Henderson, 2012), trust and communication, therefore undermine the negative influence of 
structural factors (Wang et al., 2011). Similarly, informal self-enforcing approaches relying on 
trust and communication undermine the use of formal governance of contracts (Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Contractual safeguards and controlling characteristics in the contract thus diminish the 
impact of sociological mechanisms, thereby restraining cooperative interactions between partners. 
Hawkins et al. (2008) argued that, over time, constant changes in strategies and extracted values 
may transform a relationship from being economic to social and vice versa. The underlying logic 
explains that drafting detailed and complex contracts may undermine the sociological governance, 
meaning that their combined use may not be effective. Therefore based on the above discussion 
and theoretical examination, this study argues that sociological governance mechanisms and 
contract completeness function as substitutes in minimizing ex-post transaction costs and fostering 
relationship commitment. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5: Sociological governance mechanisms and contract completeness will function as substitutes 
in (a) minimizing ex-post transaction costs, and (b) maximizing relationship commitment. 
2.4.2 Interaction of sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric dependence 
Despite the convincing opinions for viewing sociological governance and contract completeness 
as substitutes, the rationale for viewing sociological governance and symmetric dependence as 
complements seems equally compelling. The combination of sociological factors and symmetric 
dependence might provide greater inter-firm cooperation than employing them separately (Lee et 
al., 2017). Prior research has argued that symmetric dependence of inter-organizational exchange 
is socially embedded and complement in producing greater benefits (e.g., Dyer & Chu, 2011; 
Granovetter, 2005; Liu et al., 2009). However, sociological mechanisms have limitations due to 
lack of explicit approaches and bounded rationality (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), symmetric 
dependence therefore provides an institutional framework and complements sociological 
governance by offering structural constraints through a mutual hostage. Liu et al. (2009) argued 
that firms realize that damaging mutual specific investments can result in their reputation loss thus 
avoid opportunistic behavior when trust and effective communication are developed. Their 
significant empirical findings of complementarity interplay between economic and social factors 
are consistent with the prior seminal research (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Thus, the underlying 
logic explains that symmetric dependence alone is insufficient in minimizing ex-post transaction 
costs and maximizing relationship commitment, because partners may not be able to resolve the 
conflicts and external uncertainty cooperatively. Additionally, sociological mechanisms alone can 
be insufficient because of the uncertainty regarding the fair reciprocal behavior of the counterpart 
(Ali & Larimo, 2016). Where symmetric dependence promotes sociological governance, 
sociological factors facilitate structural framework to stabilize the relationship exchange. 
Therefore, we suggest positive reciprocal relationships between sociological governance 
mechanisms and symmetric dependence. Based on the above discussion, this study advances the 
following hypotheses:   
H6: Sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric dependence will function as 
complements in (a) minimizing ex-post transaction costs, and (b) maximizing relationship 
commitment. 
Figure 1 Conceptual model and hypotheses
2.5 The relative importance of economic and sociological governance mechanisms 
As we have hypothesized the interplay between governance mechanisms in order to minimize ex-
post transaction costs, we further predict that economic mechanisms are comparatively more 
effective than sociological mechanisms in improving cost performance (Yang et al., 2016). 
Relative effectiveness of governance mechanisms is characterized by nuanced understanding of 
contextual factors and boundary conditions. Different governance structures are required for 
different transaction objectives in governing relationship exchange. Better understanding of 
relationship outcomes and collaboration goals drive managers to analyze which governance 
mechanism is more crucial for a particular task (Yang et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009). Based on TCE 
reasoning, employing more complete contract and symmetric dependence in a buyer-supplier 
relationship prevent the ex-post costs of enforcing and handling (Dyer & Chu, 2003). Similarly, 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) manifested economic mechanisms as a formal framework to be used to 
resolve conflicts, alleviate the risk of misunderstandings, drive combined actions, and clarify the 
responsibilities and duties of each partner. Furthermore, explicitly described contractual clauses 
positively affect the use of a cooperative negotiation strategy (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012) and 
facilitate the continuity of operations in effective manner (Yang et al., 2016), thereby reducing ex-
post transaction costs. As, economic governance provide structural frameworks in curbing 
opportunism and transaction costs in a relationship exchange, sociological factors have limited 
power to discipline operations (Yang et al., 2016). Although trust clearly matters in relationship 
exchange and can significantly reduce transaction costs, relational governance settings alone do 
not completely provide formal framework and clear instructions in case of emergencies. Therefore, 
the risk of a partner’s high level of trust, being exploited, becomes higher. Based on the above-
mentioned reasons and the structural logic behind the relative effectiveness of economic factors, 
we hypothesize that: 
H7: Economic governance mechanisms are more effective than sociological governance 
mechanisms at minimizing ex-post transaction costs. 
While we predicted that economic governance is more effective in minimizing ex-post transaction 
costs, sociological governance, on the other hand, can be more effective than economic factors at 
maximizing relationship commitment (Yang et al., 2016). Previous empirical studies argued that 
sociological governance mechanisms overcome the adaptive boundaries of complex contracts and 
function as informal instruments in developing relationship commitment (Krause et al., 2007; 
Kohtamäki et al., 2012). Therefore, this informal governance not only share the social platforms 
but also facilitate increased knowledge sharing, problem-solving efforts and learning within a 
relationship (Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016). Furthermore, relational instruments i.e. trust and 
communication function as a counterforce to power imbalance and minimizes the influence of 
power asymmetry, thereby enhancing commitment and desire to continue the long-term 
relationship (Yang et al., 2016). Commitment flourishes and develops more when factors, such as 
trust, norms of flexibility, solidarity, and communication, robustly exist in a relationship (Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002). On the contrary, because economic governance create an explicit structural 
system, in which both parties must comply, the motivation to enhance relationship commitment is 
thus constrained. Sociological governance, therefore, support flexible environment and encourage 
relationship partners to engage in such activities beyond the limits of interdependence and contract 
clauses in order to enhance relationship commitment (Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016). Based 
on the above-mentioned reasons and the social logic behind the relative effectiveness of 
sociological governance factors, we hypothesize the following:                      
H8: Sociological governance mechanisms are more effective than economic governance 
mechanisms at maximizing relationship commitment. 
3. Research methodology
3.1 Data collection
This study consists of Finnish SMEs involved in buyer-supplier relationships operating with key 
suppliers (i.e. suppliers providing key components and services) from a variety of countries in Asia 
and Europe, as well as the USA. A sample of 892 potential SMEs was generated from a database 
operated by the Collector Finland (i.e., a financial service provider, offering cost-effective and 
innovative solutions to private and corporate customers in Nordic countries), which includes basic 
information about Nordic buyer-supplier relationships. The sample indicates that 170 SMEs had 
suppliers in three regions (Europe: 143; USA: 17; Asia: 10), with an average size of 24 
employees/SME and an average turnover of €38m/SME. The SMEs in the data set were operating 
in several dispersed classified industries, with 66.47% belonging to manufacturing and 33.53% 
belonging to the services industry. However, it was less useful when attempting to identify 
economic and sociological governance factors pertaining to the management of buyer-supplier 
relationships from the database. Therefore, we decided to collect primary data from key executives 
from Finnish SMEs in order to obtain the essential details on these buyer-supplier relationship 
issues. This database was used to identify the names and emails of potential respondents, while 
most of them were CEOs, CFOs, and board directors. Pre-testing was executed among the research 
group members in order to determine whether the respondents apprehend the questions as offered. 
Thus in spring 2015, a web-based questionnaire was designed (Dillman et al., 2009) and sent to 
892 firms by following another email to non-respondents three weeks later. In result, we collected 
170 usable responses, yielding a response rate of 19.06% (170 of 892).  
Despite this response rate, we performed an independent sample t-test as proposed by Armstrong 
and Overton (1977) in order to measure whether, and to what extent, this survey was subject to 
non-response bias, and to analyze the difference between early and late respondents (N = 85; N = 
85). No significant differences between the early and late respondents were found in terms of 
firm’s size (p = .510) and length of the relationship (p = .319). Therefore, non-response bias was 
not a problem for this study. Prior methodological literature, as well as many empirical studies 
(e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Silva et al., 2012), have taken the stance that late respondents are also 
representative of non-respondents. 
A likelihood of common method variance exists in the research when all the constructs are 
measured using the same survey (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015). Therefore, in 
order to measure and control for potential effect of common method bias, ex-ante and ex-post 
strategies were followed (Chang et al., 2010). During the ex-ante research design stage, we 
followed different strategies. First, respondents were guaranteed of anonymity and confidentiality 
regarding the study. Second, the sequence of questions was emplaced in a way that a logical 
relationship between the variables seemed unapparent, as questions related to ex-post transaction 
costs and relationship commitment were asked in different sections. After we collected data, we 
performed Harman’s one-factor test as an ex-post approach in order to measure the degree to which 
collected data is influenced negatively by common method bias. In result of non-rotated factor 
solution in exploratory factor analysis, no single or general factor was apparent explaining most 
of the variability in the data, with major factor accounting for 26.88% of total variance. Thus, 
common method variance was not a problem in the analysis.   
3.2 Measures
This study employs reflective measurement models and the items used to operationalize each 
construct were developed on a 7-point Likert scale based on the existing literature. All the 
constructs demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity with their Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR) values as well as item 
loadings in Table 1. We adapted four items for the ex-post transaction costs construct from Zaheer 
et al. (1998), which demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity (AVE: .79; CA: .75; CR: 
.83). Relationship commitment was measured using four items (AVE: .80; CA: .79; CR: .92) based 
on Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Tellefsen (2002). Trust was measured by adapting seven items 
(AVE: .78; CA: .81; CR .93) from Morgan and Hunt (1994). Communication was operationalized 
adapting four items (AVE: .83; CA: .93; CR.95) drawing from Heide and John (1992) and Young-
Ybarra and Wiersema (1999). Contract completeness including term specificity and contingency 
adaptability was measured using six items (AVE: .77; CA: .93; CR .95), based on Luo (2002, 
2009). 
The method that we employed to measure the level of symmetric dependence between partners 
was adapted from previous empirical studies (e.g., Ali & Larimo, 2016; Khalid & Ali, 2017). 
Symmetric dependence characterizes the extent to which both buyer and supplier are 
interdependent and have invested equal idiosyncratic specific assets ranged from “1 = very low to 
7 = very high”. Therefore, it was divided into buyer’s dependence and supplier’s dependence. 
Buyer dependence comprises of two items, adapted from previous research: A- we need the size 
of investment in a focal relationship, and B- we need the level of replicability, that is, we need to 
measure difficulty in redeploying the resources outside the relationship (e.g. Zeng, 1998; Reuer & 
Arino, 2002; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). In order to determine the dependence of buyer 
firm, these two items were collapsed into one. Similarly, respondents were also asked the same 
questions to specify the size of supplier’s investments in the relationship and the difficulty level 
of supplier’s investment redeployment, that were collapsed into one in order to calculate supplier 
dependence. To determine the level of symmetric dependence between buyer and supplier, a 
calculation was made by taking the absolute difference between both partner’s interdependence. 
In this instance, a zero specified a perfectly symmetric dependence of both parties. This measure 
explains the perfect symmetric dependence between partners in case of both high mutual 
dependence and low mutual dependence. 
To exemplify, suppose we have a case wherein (A) the size of investment is 4 out of 7; and (B) 
the difficulty to replace is 5 out of 7. In this case, we calculate the level of dependence by 
multiplying A by B; that is the buyer’s dependence is 4*5 = 20. Similarly, if the calculation of 
supplier’s dependence is also 20, we have a pair of buyer and supplier in which both have similar 
level of dependence, i.e. 20. As such, the difference between these values is 20 – 20 = 0, 
representing a perfect symmetric dependence. These calculations helped us to determine the level 
of symmetrical interdependence between buyer and supplier in order to analyze the data. Three 
additional variables of less interest were included to control the dependent variables. These include 
age of the firm, relationship length (Liu et al., 2009), and size of the buyer firm (Luo et al., 2015) 
as control variables because of their potential effect on dependent variables. Age of the firm was 
measured as the number of years in operation and size of the firm as a number of employees. 
Finally, relationship length indicates the time period of the relationship between buyer and 
supplier. 
Table 1. Constructs, item loadings, Cronbach's alpha (CA), AVE and composite reliability values (CR)
Constructs and items Loadings Item source(s)
Ex-post transaction cost (AVE: .79; CA: .75; CR: .83) Zaheer et al. (1998)
How easy are negotiations between your firm and key supplier firm over sharing the burden of costs 
(not explicitly covered by the contract) when (very difficult 1-7 very easy):
…your business unit requests engineering changes? 0.85
…supplier X’s raw material costs increase? 0.87
How quick are negotiations between your firm and key supplier firm over sharing the burden of 
costs (not explicitly covered by the contract) when (very slow 1-7 very quick):
…your business unit requests engineering changes? 0.81
…supplier X’s raw material costs increase? 0.83
Relationship commitment (AVE: .80; CA: .79; CR: .92) Anderson and Weitz (1992) 
and Tellefsen (2002)
Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following statements concerning supplier commitment 
(strongly disagree 1-7 strongly agree)?
…we have a strong sense of loyalty to our key supplier 0.87
…we are continually on the lookout for new sources to replace our supplier (R) 0.89
…we are very committed to our key supplier 0.91
…we expect to be doing business with our key supplier for a long time 0.90
Trust (AVE: .78; CA: .81; CR .93) Morgan and Hunt (1994)
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly 
agree):
Our key supplier firm: 
…cannot be trusted at times (R) 0.91
…is perfectly honest and truthful 0.93
…can be trusted completely 0.96
…can be counted on to do what is right 0.89
…is always faithful 0.93
…is someone I have great confidence in 0.92
…has high integrity 0.91
Communication (AVE: .83; CA: .93; CR .95) Heide and John (1992) and 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999)
Regarding communication between you and your key supplier, please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly agree):
…we always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party 0.88
…it is expected that any information, which might help the other party, will be provided to them 0.91
…it is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party 0.91
…exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, not only 
according to a pre-specified agreement
0.94
Contract completeness (AVE: .77; CA: .93; CR .95) Luo (2002) and Luo (2009)
To what extent are the following arrangements with your key supplier firm formalized in the written 
contract (not at all 1-7 entirely)?
…how to operate and manage the relationship 0.86
…how to cooperate, coordinate, and resolve conflicts between your firm and key supplier 0.91
…how to terminate the relationship 0.85
…how to handle the unanticipated contingencies during relationship formation and operation 0.88
…cost and quality of resources invested in relationship 0.88
…how to secure invested resources from exploitation 0.90
Symmetric dependence Zeng (1998), Reuer and Arino 
(2002) and Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999)
Items measuring the dependence of buyer firm (very low 1-7 very high):
…our investment in the relationship is
…if this relationship was to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments would be
Items measuring the dependence of key supplier firm (very low 1-7 very high):
…supplier firm’s investment in the relationship is
…if this relationship was to dissolve, the key supplier firm’s non-recoverable investments would be
Symmetric dependence:
Level of symmetric dependence between buyer and key supplier (i.e., difference between dependence 
of buyer and supplier firm) [0 = 7, 1-8 = 6, 9-16 = 5, 17-24 = 4, 25-32 = 3, 33-40 = 2, 41-48 = 1]
1
3.3 Measure validation
To analyze our deductive-nomological model, we utilized a nonparametric technique (i.e., partial 
least squares - PLS) to variance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) by using SmartPLS 2.0 
software (Chin, 1998; Ringle, Wende & Will, 2005) for the following reasons. Firstly, we adopted 
variance based PLS-SEM approach because this study tests an explorative model with alternative 
hypotheses, i.e. whether economic and sociological governance mechanisms (direct effect and 
interaction effect) explain ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Secondly, PLS-
SEM is capable of modeling latent constructs beyond measurement error, therefore is appropriate 
to test interaction effects in particular (Chin, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2008). Thirdly, PLS-SEM 
modelling is not only considered as the most suitable approach when dealing with a small sample 
size but it also allows researchers to evaluate both formative and reflective measurement models 
simultaneously as well as hierarchical models (Becker et al., 2012; Hair et al., 2012a). Thus, it 
exhibits higher statistical power than covariance-based SEM when used on complex models with 
limited sample size (Hair et al., 2012a; Hair et al., 2012b; Chin, 1998). This is particularly 
applicable to this study, as the final sample size was 170 buyer-supplier relationships. Furthermore, 
multivariate normal data is not required in PLS-SEM modeling (Chin, 1998). Therefore, growing 
number of recent industrial marketing and management studies employed PLS-SEM because of 
its dynamic attributes (e.g., Kohtamäki et al., 2012; Khalid & Ali, 2017; Zaefarian et al., 2017; 
Najafi-Tavani et al., 2015; Mitrega et al., 2017). 
Although PLS modeling evaluates both structural and measurement model at the same time, this 
study followed Hulland’s (1999) technique in testing models. We analyzed and interpreted the 
estimated model in two phases: first, the estimation and reliability of the measurement model, and, 
second, the evaluating the structural model. We also validated measurement model by evaluating 
the individual item reliabilities: convergent and discriminant validity (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 
2012b). All the loaded indicators on latent variables are above Gotz et al.’s (2010) recommended 
a level of 0.7, which specifies a high degree of item reliability, whereas the mean of composite 
reliability (CR) represents the construct reliability for each latent variable. The composite 
reliability is noted higher than the threshold of 0.6. Further, the average variance extracted (AVE) 
with a greater value than the threshold of 0.5 is considered for all the latent variables in order to 
evaluate the convergent validity of the reflective block of the model (Gotz et al., 2010), 
demonstrating satisfactorily valid. 
Table 2 exhibits the inter-construct correlations and average variance extracted. Previous studies 
also recommended that if square roots of the AVEs are statistically higher than correlations among 
the latent constructs, discriminant validity could be assured (Chin, 1998; Gotz et al., 2010). We 
also assessed the level of multi-collinearity between the constructs and variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was found well below five (the highest VIF values is 1.78), thus indicating no significant 
multi-collinearity (Hair et al., 2012a, 2012b). Additionally, we computed a confirmatory factor 
analysis, and the results specify a good model fit (χ2 = 277.90, d.f. = 165, RMSEA = .064, GFI = 
.873, CFI = .961, NFI = .911, IFI = .962). Hence, we safely conclude that all the constructs and 
items were found to be satisfactorily sound, assuring discriminant validity and reliability. 
4. Analysis and results
4.1 Structural estimates
We employed PLS-analysis (a path weighting technique with a maximum of 300 iterations) in 
order to test our direct effect and interaction effect hypotheses (i.e. H1-H6), and a bootstrapping 
method of sampling was utilized to generate t-values (Hair et al., 2012a; Chin, 1998). These 
structural estimations are presented in table 3 where R2 (i.e., the coefficient of determination) for 
the dependent variable, path loadings (i.e., standardized β) and significance levels demonstrate the 
main effects (Gotz et al., 2010). The nomological validity of our model was evaluated by 
examining the explained variance R2 for each dependent construct in our framework (Sarstedt et 
al., 2014). The R2 for dependent variables in Models 3 and 7 are 0.29 and 0.32, respectively, which 
posits that the independent constructs describe 29% of the variance in ex-post transaction costs 
and 32% of the variance in relationship commitment. 
Table 2. Inter-construct correlations, AVE and square roots of AVE along the diagonal
From the results of Model 3, significant negative relationships were found between contract 
completeness and ex-post transaction costs (β = -0.40, p ≤ 0.01) and between symmetric 
dependence and ex-post transaction costs (β = -0.13, p ≤ 0.05). These results support H1. Further, 
Model 7 shows that contract completeness (β = 0.19, p ≤ 0.01) exerts a significant and positive 
effect on relationship commitment. However, symmetric dependence does not significantly relate 
to relationship commitment. These results partially support H2 (H2a = supported, H2b = not 
supported)1. Furthermore, from Model 3, significant negative relationships were found between 
communication and ex-post transaction costs (β = -0.30, p ≤ 0.05) and between trust and ex-post 
transaction costs (β = -0.18, p ≤ 0.05). These results support H3. Further results from Model 7 
indicate that communication (β = 0.33, p ≤ 0.01) and trust (β = 0.17, p ≤ 0.05) exert a significant 
and positive effect on relationship commitment. These results support H4.
Table 3. PLS analysis results (standardized beta coefficients & t-values)
Constructs Transaction costs Relationship commitment
Model 1 Model 
2















1 We further split the contract completeness construct into two sub-dimensions of term specificity and contingency 
adaptability and examined the effect of each of these sub-dimensions on both ex-post transaction costs as well as on 
relationship commitment. The results suggests that term specificity has negative impact on ex-post transaction costs 
(β = -0.28, p ≤ 0.05) and positive impact on relationship commitment (β = 0.27, p ≤ 0.05), however the path from 
contingency adaptability to these dependent variables while in a right direction, is not significant. These finding 
suggest that term specificity is more important in explaining transaction cost and can increase relationship 
commitment. 
Constructs AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Communication 0.83 0.91
2. Trust 0.78 0.47 0.88
3. Contract completeness 0.77 0.20 0.12 0.88
4. Symmetric dependence 1 0.04 0.02 0.04 1
5. Age of the company 1 0.19 -0.01 0.06 0.06 1
6. Relationship length 1 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.52 1
7. Size of buyer firm 1 0.02 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.32 0.28 1
8. Transaction costs 0.79 -0.31 -0.17 -0.29 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 0.89



























































Size of buyer firm 
(i.e., # of employees)
0.09 (0.82) 0.05 
(0.46)
0.02 (0.65) 0.03 (0.28) -0.06 
(0.64)
-0.01 (0.19) -0.02 
(0.30)
0.01 (0.08)






0.16 (1.33) 0.09 (0.74) 0.08 (0.68) 0.06 (0.60)
Age of company 0.04 (0.26) 0.05 
(0.34)
0.01 (0.47) 0.10 (0.82) -0.01 
(0.02)




R2 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.35 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.43
*** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05
Models 4 and 8 respectively in Table 3 are used to examine the interaction effects between 
sociological mechanisms and contract completeness and between sociological mechanisms and 
symmetric dependence in relation to ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. We 
mean-centered and multiplied the indicators of sociological mechanisms and economic factors to 
obtain the interaction effects. Several researchers have confirmed that negative coefficients of 
interacting variables would support a substitute relationship whereas positive coefficients suggest 
a complementary relationship (e.g., Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Liu et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Wang 
et al., 2011). In relation to ex-post transaction costs, results in Model 4 suggest that interaction 
between trust and contract completeness (β = 0.19, p ≤ 0.05) is positive and significant while the 
interaction between communication and contract completeness is positive, albeit non-significant. 
Whereas, the results from Model 8 show that interaction between trust and contract completeness 
(β = -0.16, p ≤ 0.05), is negative and significant. Similarly, the interaction between communication 
and contract completeness (β = -0.20, p ≤ 0.05) is negative and significant, in relation to 
relationship commitment. These results partially support H5a and completely support H5b, 
representing substitute relationships between sociological governance mechanisms and contract 
completeness. Further, in relation to ex-post transaction costs, the interaction between trust and 
symmetric dependence (β = -0.17, p ≤ 0.05) is negative and significant. Meanwhile, the interaction 
between communication and symmetric dependence is negative and significant (β = -0.15, p ≤ 
0.05). On the other hand, the interaction between trust and symmetric dependence (β = 0.14, p ≤ 
0.05), in relation to relationship commitment, is significant and positive, while the interaction 
between communication and symmetric dependence (β = 0.13, p ≤ 0.05) is significant and positive. 
These results lend full support to H6a and H6b, representing complementary relationships between 
sociological governance mechanisms and symmetric dependence.   
4.2 Relative power of governance mechanisms
To test hypotheses H7 and H8, two methods were employed to compare the relative powers of 
economic and sociological governance mechanisms, as offered and used by Liu et al. (2009). 
Firstly, if we take “ex-post transaction costs”, for example, we can get ΔR2 as per the regression 
results of Models 1, 2 and 3: 
ΔR2 Model 3-Model 1 = R2Model 3- R2Model 1 = .29 - .25 
  = .04
ΔR2 Model 3-Model 2 = R2Model 3- R2Model 2 = .29 - .21 
  = .08
Here, ΔR2 Model 3−Model 1 describes the proportion of the variance of ex-post transaction costs that 
sociological mechanisms can explain, while ΔR2 Model 3−Model 2 represents the proportion of the 
variance of ex-post transaction costs, that economic mechanisms can explain. As ΔR2 Model 3−Model 
2 > ΔR2 Model 3−Model 1, this suggests that economic mechanisms are statistically stronger in effecting 
ex-post transaction costs than sociological mechanisms. Further, taking “relationship 
commitment” as the dependent variable, we acquire ΔR2 as per the regression results of Models 5, 
6 and 7: 
ΔR2 Model 7-Model 5 = R2Model 7- R2Model 5 = .32 - .19 
  = .13
ΔR2 Model 7-Model 6 = R2Model 7- R2Model 6 = .32 - .25 
  = .07
Here, ΔR2 Model 7−Model 5 represents the proportion of the variance of relationship commitment, that 
sociological mechanisms can explain, while ΔR2 Model 7−Model 6 represents the proportion of the 
variance of relationship commitment, that economic mechanisms can explain. As ΔR2 Model 7−Model 
6 < ΔR2 Model 7−Model 5, this suggests that sociological mechanisms are statistically stronger in 
influencing relationship commitment than economic mechanisms. Notably, none of the control 
variables was significantly related to ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment.
Secondly, the semi-partial correlation was performed to further examine the above relative 
predicting power (see Table 4), which represents the independent influence of a predicting variable 
to the dependent variable controlling for the effect of other variables (Liu et al., 2009). The impact 
of economic mechanisms on attenuating ex-post transaction costs equals the sum of the impact of 
contract completeness and symmetric dependence, which is 0.081 (0.060 + 0.021). Similarly, the 
impact of sociological mechanisms on shrinking ex-post transaction costs equals to the sum of the 
impact of trust and communication, which is 0.055 (0.030 + 0.025). The impact of economic 
mechanisms on ex-post transaction costs is found to be stronger than the impact of sociological 
mechanisms. This test also confirms that the impact of economic mechanisms on relationship 
commitment (0.029 + 0.001 = 0.030) is smaller than that of sociological mechanisms (0.076 + 
0.022 = 0.098). Therefore, these findings support H7 and H8, which recommend that economic 
governance mechanisms are more powerful in shaping ex-post transaction costs, while 
sociological governance mechanisms are more effective in maximizing relationship commitment. 
Table 4. Semi-partial correlation for the predicting power of governance mechanisms
Ex-post transaction costs Relationship commitment
Part correlation Square of part correlation Part correlation Square of part 
correlation
Economic governance mechanisms
Contract completeness -0.246 0.060 0.170 0.029
Symmetric dependence -0.147 0.021 0.039 0.001
Sociological governance mechanisms 
Communication -0.176 0.030 0.275 0.076
Trust -0.159 0.025 0.150 0.022
Control variables
# of employees 0.052 0.002 -0.108 0.012
Age of company 0.068 0.005 0.011 0.000
Age of relationship -0.090 0.008 0.071 0.005
5. Discussion and implications
5.1 Results summary 
We developed and empirically tested a combined model of economic (i.e., contract completeness 
and symmetric dependence) and sociological (i.e., trust and communication) governance 
mechanisms, which minimize ex-post transaction costs and maximize relationship commitment. 
Based on the analysis of 170 buyer-supplier relationships involving Finnish SMEs, this study had 
resulted in several noteworthy findings. First, economic and sociological mechanisms are equally 
important in terms of transaction costs containment to relationship commitment development. 
Second, this study notably incorporates complementarity view of sociological governance 
mechanisms and symmetric dependence, consistent with prior research. On the other hand, 
sociological governance mechanisms and contractual governance found as substitutes in 
explaining ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Third, economic mechanisms 
perform a more powerful role in minimizing ex-post transaction costs, whereas sociological 
mechanisms enhance relationship commitment more effectively. Overall, these results suggest the 
significance of varying roles of relationship governance mechanisms in order to govern 
relationship exchange effectively.            
5.2 Theoretical implications      
Recent studies have emphasized on governance structure that develops relationship performance 
(Liu et al., 2017a; Luo et al., 2015), credibility and quantity of knowledge transfer (Liu et al., 
2017b), relational satisfaction (Yang et al., 2016; Gorton et al., 2015) while minimizing conflicts 
(Lee et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017) and opportunism (Luo et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2009). 
Conflicting empirical results on the nature of governance mechanisms (i.e., commentary and/or 
substitutes) and their isolated existence have overlooked the significant question of varying roles 
of governance mechanisms. Therefore, this study contributes to the industrial marketing and 
management literature by providing a comprehensive picture of relative effectiveness, as well as 
the joint use of both economic and sociological governance structure.         
In particular, we advance the research in following ways. First, this study develops an integrated 
framework of inter-organizational cooperation by synthesizing two relevant theories, namely, TCE 
and SET. The findings support and add to TCE reasoning and empirically demonstrate that the 
higher extent of contract completeness prevents the possibilities of exchange hazards, conflicts 
and contingencies, and opportunistic behavior (Luo, 2009; Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017b). Our 
findings offer an additional insight by providing empirical evidence in an SME setting and explain 
that contractual governance provides an institutional framework to relationship partners in 
safeguarding ex-post transaction costs, opportunistic behavior and performance problems by 
controlling the private objectives of partners at the cost of mutual benefits (Lee et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the significant effect of symmetric dependence in terms of minimizing ex-post 
transaction costs reveals that increase in the level of symmetric dependence creates mutual hostage 
and loyalty, and stabilizes the relationship by realigning the self-interest and the expectations of 
continuous future transactions (Liu et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017b). Similarly, a relatively complete 
contract keeps the relationship partners committed by providing a convincing signal, restraining 
uncertainty about behaviors and functioning as deterrence against exploitation and opportunism. 
Thus, contractual completeness is considered as important manifestation of tangible expressions 
of confidence and commitment between relationship partners by explicitly clarifying prior 
equivocal results (Woolthuis et al., 2005; Burkert et al., 2012). 
However, contrary to the expectation, we found no significant positive relationship between 
symmetric dependence and relationship commitment. This finding is against the arguments 
advanced by scholars (e.g., Xie et al., 2010; Burkert et al., 2012) who posit that idiosyncratic 
relationship-specific investment are considered as a commitment device as well as the indications 
of adopting longstanding coordination by contributing a strong bond and providing incentives for 
not abandoning the exchange relationship. One possible explanation for this may be that symmetric 
dependence includes not only the issue of symmetry but also the level of mutual dependence (i.e., 
high and low mutual dependence) since low and high mutual dependence should not have the same 
impact on relationship commitment. It is not likely that firms are more committed at a lower level 
of symmetric dependence because of their lower stakes in the relationship. Furthermore, the level 
of interdependence between firms may vary because same amount of relationship-specific 
investments do not mean the same to the firms highly different in size (i.e., an investment of 1 
million US$ does not mean the same to each partner). 
Among the sociological governance mechanisms, our findings also confirm some major reasoning 
found in the literature and demonstrate the effectiveness of trust and communication. SET suggests 
that relationship exchange should be rooted in strong relational ties between buyer and supplier in 
order to control operational hazards (Granovetter, 2005; Liu et al., 2017b). Therefore, trust, timely 
information sharing, and open communication within relationship exchange lower the level of ex-
post transaction costs (Gulbrandsen et al., 2017; Yigitbasioglu, 2010). Likewise, the notion of a 
positive relationship between sociological governance mechanisms and relationship commitment 
extends the view depicted in prior research (Hung & Lin, 2013; Burkert et al., 2012). This study 
suggests that, based on the relational goodwill, effective communication is crucial in knowledge 
sharing and consistency, resulting in the resolution of conflicts and relationship commitment 
development (Yen et al., 2011). These findings are congruent with recent research, which suggests 
that trust and communication are the significant sociological factors in managing successful 
business relationships (e.g., Liu et al., 2017b; Gulbrandsen et al., 2017). 
Second, it empirically tests the interaction effects of sociological mechanisms with contract 
completeness and symmetric dependence respectively in relation to ex-post transaction costs and 
relationship commitment. The prior research presents competing views on the nature of the 
relationship i.e. complementary or substitutive between governance mechanisms (e.g., Van der 
Valk et al., 2016; Li et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2017). This study offers additional insight and 
incorporates complementarity view of sociological mechanisms and symmetric dependence, and 
substitution view of sociological mechanisms and contract completeness. Notably, the interaction 
effects of trust and communication with symmetric dependence found to be complementary, 
explaining that firms can adopt these factors simultaneously in order to get cost advantages. These 
findings are congruent with the understanding of several authors (e.g., Dyer & Chu 2011; Ali & 
Larimo, 2016; Liu et al., 2009) who consider symmetric dependence as a form of relational 
governance, in which partners willingly binding them in a relationship for the purpose of social 
goodwill. Furthermore, the interaction effect of trust and contract completeness appeared as 
substitutes, explaining that firms adopt them alternatively because the presence of one obviates the 
use of other (Li et al., 2010; Lui & Ngo, 2004; Wang et al., 2011; Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). 
This substitution view suggests that drafting a detailed contract may be seen as counterproductive 
to trust and hinder the formation of sociological governance by enforcing contractual clauses, 
thereby increasing opportunism and transaction costs (Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). In a same 
fashion, Gulati and Sytch (2008) maintain that trust hinders the need of hierarchical control factors 
and functions as an effective alternative sociological mechanism countering opportunistic 
behavior. This notion posits that employing them simultaneously may complicate the 
understanding of inter-firm relationships, which in turn restricts the enhancement of relationship 
commitment. Therefore, this study suggests that contractual governance functions as substitutes 
with sociological governance, and can be adopted alternatively depending upon the objectives of 
the collaboration (Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). Instead, symmetric dependence more easily 
complements sociological governance because of its nature of relational embeddedness (Lee et al., 
2017). 
Finally, it shows the relative power of economic and sociological mechanisms on ex-post 
transaction costs and relationship commitment. Although both governance mechanisms drive cost 
advantage and commitment, their effects are different (Liu et al., 2017b; Yang et al., 2016). Our 
findings suggest that economic mechanisms are more powerful than sociological mechanisms in 
minimizing ex-post transaction costs. This notion elucidates that economic governance structure 
provides a formal framework to firms in clarifying the responsibilities and duties of relationship 
partners (Liu et al., 2017b) and facilitate the continuity of operations in effective manner while 
alleviating conflicts and additional bargaining costs more effectively than sociological structure 
(Yang et al., 2016; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). However, sociological factors are more effective than 
economic mechanisms in maximizing relationship commitment, explaining that social factors 
support flexible environment and overcomes the adaptive boundaries of complex contracts, and 
function as informal counterforce to power imbalance inhibiting opportunistic behavior (Krause 
et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2016). This finding does not only extend our 
understanding of varying governance mechanisms in order to incorporate their distinguishing 
power but also specifies their central role in managing successful inter-firm relationships. 
Therefore, we argue that different governance structures are required for different transaction 
objectives in governing successful relationship exchange. Better understanding of relationship 
outcomes and collaboration goals drive managers to analyze which governance mechanism is more 
crucial for a particular task (Yang et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2009).
5.3 Managerial implications 
Governing successful inter-organizational relationships requires relationship managers to show 
their willingness and commitment in planning and exercising the optimal governance structure, 
therefore, this study has several vital implications for SME managers. For this reason, firms should 
consider making different choices about governance mechanisms under different transaction 
objectives. The collaboration objectives drive managers to analyze which governance mechanism 
is more crucial for a particular task. Contractual governance may function as the foundation of a 
relationship, but relational based governance support firms to continue long-term relationships 
through cost advantage and fostered commitment. On the other hand, in the case of lack of trust 
between partner firms, drafting an explicitly complete contract prevents ex-post negotiations and 
reflects a sign of commitment, thus minimizing any possible opportunistic behavior. Further, firms 
are required to ensure the quality of an emplaced communication system, which reduces the 
possible information asymmetries and allows firms to share substantial knowledge for internal 
operations and external market conditions. This information sharing will protect relationship 
exchange from behavioral uncertainty and mitigate ex-post transaction costs, thereby keeping the 
firms committed. Additionally, our results suggest that symmetric dependence between firms 
inhibits any possible exploitation and opportunistic behavior, due to idiosyncratic investments. 
Managers should ensure a trustworthy relationship, which provides both partners with a certain 
level of confidence and align their business objectives accordingly. Another managerial 
implication of our study is the relative effectiveness of economic and sociological mechanisms. 
Our results suggest that firms seeking transaction costs advantage should pay more attention to 
economic governance mechanisms, whereas managers with the intention of resolving a large 
number of conflicts in an informal manner and develop personal ties should refer more to 
sociological governance mechanisms.          
5.4 Limitations and further research
This study has some limitations that need to be addressed in further research. Firstly, drawing from 
the theories of TCE and SET, this study only investigates four governance mechanisms to derive 
the impact on ex-post transaction costs and relationship commitment. Further study may 
incorporate some other governance mechanisms, such as conflict resolution strategies, relational 
norms, uncertainty, complexity, and the reputations of partners. Noteworthy results can be found 
by employing individual and interaction effects of these additional governance mechanisms on 
opportunism, satisfaction, and overall relationship performance. Moreover, boundary conditions 
under which each of these mechanisms become more effective also ought to be investigated in 
future research. Secondly, this study consists of only Finnish small and medium buyer-supplier 
relationships, future efforts, may extend the existing Nordic SME sample in order to generalize 
the findings for the whole region. Thirdly, because this study represents a cross-sectional approach 
where only the buyer’s perspective was probed in relation to governance mechanisms, it would be 
interesting to know how suppliers, either within a longitudinal setting or from a dyadic perspective, 
perceive the impact of governance mechanisms and their outcomes. 
Fourthly, this study is limited to a single key informant. Future studies can obtain data from 
numerous but different respondents for assessing the independent and dependent constructs in 
order to reduce common method bias. Finally, we recommend future research in order to consider 
some additional issues. We encourage further research to investigate the impact of several 
governance mechanisms on a broad range of transaction costs (i.e., ex-ante and ex-post) as well as 
investigating the relationship between transaction costs and relationship commitment. Future 
research may also investigate the role of contingency factors on the complementary-substitution 
nature of economic and sociological governance mechanisms. Caniëls and Gelderman (2007) 
argued that a consensus regarding the optimal operationalization of interdependence lacks in the 
literature and resulted in contradictory findings (Kumar et al., 1995). Therefore, we also encourage 
researchers to advance refined measures of symmetric dependence by encompassing various 
aspects of dependence. Symmetric dependence may be more than the issue of symmetry and 
include the level of mutual dependence (i.e., high and low mutual dependence) because of the 
firms highly different in size (Ali & Larimo, 2016).
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